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Abstract—Digital Forensics is a discipline that primarily focuses on 
the post-incident side of an investigation. However, during the last 
decade, there is a considerable amount of research that considers 
proactive measures taken by an organization. Such measures 
comprise a digital forensic readiness plan. This paper first presents 
research initiatives on forensic readiness across the public sector 
and the academia, and then critically evaluates their motivations 
and objectives by pointing out gaps that need bridging. Lastly, it 
informally proposes steps to guide the formulation of a forensic 
readiness policy. 
Keywords-digital forensic readiness; proactive forensics; forensic 
readiness policy 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Digital forensics deals with the application of scientific 
knowledge for collecting, analyzing, and presenting legal 
evidence [1]. While most organizations rely on planning the post-
incident investigation and procedures by developing an incident 
response plan, they do not consider the preparation of systems, 
procedures and staff before an incident occurs. Such preparation 
and planning is defined as digital forensic readiness and involves 
the identification, preservation and storage of digital evidence 
(DE). 
Digital forensic readiness’ basic objectives are to maximize 
an organization’s ability to collect and use (admissible in court) 
digital evidence and to minimize the cost of forensics on incident 
response [2]. Alternatively, forensic readiness is cited as 
proactive digital forensics, a term introduced by Bradford, 
Brown, Purdue and Self [3] to include all preventative security 
measures taken by a system. 
The implementation of digital forensics (proactive or 
reactive) standards across the public and private sector has been 
facing a number of difficulties. One of them is the evolving 
nature of digital forensics investigation procedures. The 
procedures are constantly changing as a response to the evolving 
skills and techniques of the organized crime. The same is true of 
the lack of technical forensics standardization both in the industry 
and academia. Despite the growing awareness and academic 
research on proactive forensics, its specification and 
implementation is still not consistent in the digital forensics 
community [4]. 
Another difficulty in implementing digital forensics standards 
is the complexity of the information security legal background. 
Law enforcement should evolve as a response to the growing 
demands of technology related crime [5]. Additionally, in many 
cases such as cybercrime, differences in jurisdictions prove to be 
a severe obstacle [6]. In response to the aforementioned technical 
and legal difficulties, governments have commenced research on 
forensic readiness standards.  
In this paper we present and evaluate initiatives on digital 
forensic readiness across four common law countries: United 
Kingdom, United States, Australia and Canada. The initiatives 
identified are either introduced by a government (United 
Kingdom, Canada), an international organization (ISO) or are the 
outputs of government-funded research (United States, Australia 
and Canada). However, the UK government initiative is the only 
one to have been implemented up to now and therefore, provides 
the sole base of our recommendations. To be more precise, 
learning from the UK paradigm, we will propose the basic axes 
around which the formulation of a forensic readiness policy 
should be based. The paper primarily intends to shed light on the 
proactive forensics field by identifying governmental mandatory 
requirements, and academic research projects, pointing out gaps 
that need bridging and key policies the initiatives are aiming to 
put in place.  
The governmental and academic initiatives in digital forensic 
readiness and the associate reports published have been 
introduced in an already compound legal background consisting 
of several laws, policies and regulations. Contrary to the legal 
situation in continental law countries, the countries under review 
(United Kingdom, United States, Australia and Canada) are, to a 
greater extent, characterized by an oral and adversarial procedure 
[7]. Table 1 depicts the jurisdictional background behind the 
proposal of each initiative on proactive forensics. The table 
(chronologically by country) enlists the primary legal initiatives 
(laws, policies, reviews, strategies and reports) by giving a brief 
description on its scope and objectives. 
TABLE I.  BACKGROUND LEGISLATION IN THE COUNTRIES UNDER REVIEW 
Name Year Area Objective 
Computer 
Misuse Act 1990 UK 
To introduce the core legislation 
on information security. 
Data Protection 
Act  1998 UK 
To govern the protection of 
personal data in the UK. 
Freedom of 
Information 
Act 
2000 UK To provide information disclosure regulations across the UK.  
National 
Information 
Assurance 
Strategy 
2007 UK 
To set a framework in 
Information Risk Management by 
delivering minimum standards in 
the collaboration between the 
government and the private 
sector. 
Power of 
Information 
Report 
2007 UK 
To review the creation, use and 
flow of public information and 
makes 15 recommendations to 
improve digital participation. 
The Coleman 
Report 2008 UK 
To propose a set of 
recommendations on the conduct 
of transactions within the 
government. 
Digital Britain 
Report 2008 UK 
To offer a strategic view of the 
digital technology sector. 
CIP National 
Strategy 2004 AUS 
To outline the need for critical 
infrastructure protection in 
Australia.  
E-Security 
Review 2008 AUS 
To examine the Australian 
Government’s framework on 
electronic security by researching 
network intrusion and physical 
attacks.  
PM National 
Security 
Statement 
2008 AUS 
To outline the government’s 
security policy by focusing on 
five security interests. 
Cyber Security 
Strategy 2009 AUS 
To set the background on the 
government’s policy. It aims to 
outline new priorities and 
describes new capabilities for the 
implementation of a new strategy. 
Computer 
Fraud and 
Abuse Act 
1986 US 
To serve as the foundation law on 
computer-assisted crime and to 
reduce offences between federal 
computer systems. 
Name Year Area Objective 
Cyber Security 
Enhancement 
Act 
2002 US 
To provide standards on 
information disclosure between 
government agencies and Internet 
Service Providers (ISP).  
Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act 2002 US 
To provide standards on the 
operation of public organizations. 
To enable the accurate and 
reliable financial reporting of 
organisations. 
The National 
Strategy to 
Secure 
Cyberspace 
2003 US 
To serve as a guideline to US 
organizations, businesses and 
individuals on cyberspace 
security.  
Cyberspace 
Policy Review 2009 US 
To review policies on information 
assurance, effective information 
sharing and incident response.  
Canada’s 
National 
Security Policy 
2004 CAN 
To ensure the establishment of 
mechanisms that ensures national 
security. 
 
This paper is divided into four sections. The current section 
introduced the major difficulties in the implementation of digital 
forensic readiness standards and presented the jurisdictional 
background in the countries under review. The second section 
identifies initiatives in forensic readiness and points out 
challenges that need to be addressed. The third section presents 
background research on forensic readiness policy and describes 
our approach to assist in the formulation of such a policy. The 
fourth section summarizes the paper and proposes further 
directions and practical work to be carried out. 
II. INITIATIVES 
A. United Kingdom 
Recent developments in the United Kingdom have brought 
proactive forensics in the forefront of information security. Being 
forensically ready to respond to any incident has now become a 
mandatory requirement for all organizations and agencies 
connected with the UK government. According to the Cabinet 
Office [8], the UK government department responsible for 
ensuring policy and operations implementation, the operation of 
such measures is fundamental for public confidence and ensures 
efficient, effective and safe conduct of public business.  
1) Motivation and Objectives 
The main motive behind the proposal and implementation of 
a digital forensic readiness scheme was the HM Revenue and 
Customs (HMRC) incident. On October 18, 2007 the HMRC 
offices in Tyne and Wear sent to the National Audit Office 
(NAO) in London two CDs containing personal information of 
25 million individuals and 7.25 million UK families claiming 
child benefits. Despite the search initiated by Chancellor A. 
Darling, the CDs (sent in standard internal mail) were officially 
reported as missing on November 14, 2007 [9]. The loss of data 
(including personal details, National Insurance numbers and bank 
details) resulted in the resignation of Paul Gray, chairman of the 
HMRC and the immediate commencement of government-led 
research. 
In the aftermath of the events, two review reports were 
published: the independent “Kieran Poynter Review”, and the 
Cabinet’s Office “Data Handling Procedures in Government: 
Final Report”. The report issued by Kieran Poynter [10] 
evaluated the factors contributing to the loss of data.  The key 
conclusions of the report included the lack of information 
security awareness across staff and the lack of adherence to the 
formal policies and guidelines of the HMRC. On the other hand, 
the Cabinet Office report [11] composed a number of core 
measures for the improvement of data handling across 
governmental departments and stressed out the need for the 
introduction of a set of minimum requirements. 
The corollary of these reports was the publication of the 
“Cross Government Actions: Mandatory Minimum Measures” 
report by the Cabinet Office, which proposed 22 minimum 
mandatory requirements to all government departments. One of 
the requirements for all departments is “to have a forensic 
readiness policy to maximize their ability to preserve, analyze 
and use evidence from an ICT system required for legal and 
management purposes”[12].  
The final update of the UK government research was the 
publication of the HMG Security Policy Framework (SPF) in 
May 2010, according to which departments and agencies must 
have the ability to regularly audit information assets and ICT 
systems including a Forensic Readiness Policy (FRP) [8]. The 
requirements of the SPF ensure that all information sharing 
between government agencies will be implemented properly and 
that the risk of information modification, alteration and/or 
disclosure to third parties will be minimized. The Information 
Risk Management (IRM) procedure is assisted by the 
implementation of the Information Assurance Maturity Model 
(IAMM)[13], a five-step framework that supports the 
management team towards achieving compliance with the SPF 
(Fig. 1).  
Figure 1.  Information Assurance Maturity Model - Best Practice Measures 
2) Gaps that Need Bridging 
The implementation of a digital forensic readiness scheme in 
an organization depends on the formulation of an FRP and on 
compliance with the IAMM framework. The formulation of an 
FRP is a critical task for an organization; it is very important to 
compose such a policy based on official standards. Up to now, 
CESG (Communications-Electronics Security Group), the UK 
Government’s National Authority for Information Assurance, has 
published a guide entitled “Good Practice Guide 18 - Forensic 
Readiness” [14]. The guide intends to assist organizations in 
composing an FRP and in ensuring it is frequently tested. 
However, the guide is not adequately detailed and as a result, 
organizations will most probably turn for help to private 
companies. 
Similarly, compliance with the IAMM framework will be 
determined by a number of requirements. It is quite true that 
implementing a framework, which is based on change 
management techniques, provides an objective assessment on 
compliance to standards. Yet in reality the most important factor 
on standards compliance is the degree to which certain 
(intangible) variables such as business processes, procedures, 
strategy and needs will be evaluated. Amendments and updates to 
the SPF and supporting IAMM framework are expected to 
address these issues.   
B. Canada (Academic) 
The University of British Columbia in Canada has initiated a 
Digital Records Forensics project. This project is aimed at 
integrating digital forensics with disciplines pertaining to 
diplomatics, archival science, information science and evidence 
law to create an interdisciplinary graduate degree program, called 
Digital Records Forensics Studies.  The program anticipates the 
need for organizations to be able for timely response in the event 
of an incident [15].  
1) Motivation and Objectives 
According to the University of British Columbia, the original 
motivation for the Digital Records Forensics project dates back to 
the 17th century in determining the authenticity of medieval 
records of questionable origin.  This problem overlaps to some 
extent with the modern problem of determining the authenticity 
of electronic records, as can be used as digital evidence in a court 
of law [15]. The interdisciplinary research project, as undertaken 
by members of the University of British Columbia, aims to: 
• enable those who need to assess the trustworthiness of 
digital records that no longer reside in the original system 
in which they were made or received and maintained to 
ascertain whether they are accurate and authentic, having 
preserved their original identity and integrity;  
• foster development of methods for maintaining the 
authenticity of these records over the long term, 
regardless of their format;  
• ensure that the Law of Evidence maintains an awareness 
of the changing nature of documentary evidence 
determined by digital technologies and adjusts its 
requirements and procedures to the changing 
characteristics of such evidence;  
• contribute to organisational forensic readiness as firms 
and agencies anticipate the need to support legal action 
with admissible digital evidence; and  
• allow for the development of education programs 
forming professionals capable of acquiring, as well as 
creating, assessing, controlling and maintaining reliable, 
accurate and authentic records for as long as they are 
needed [15]. 
Although this project is very wide, it does address proactive 
forensics as a sub component.  The project is still in progress, and 
not a lot more information is available on it.  However, the main 
output of this project would be to present a graduate module that 
can be presented to students that plan to work as forensic 
investigators in the corporate environment.   
C. Canada (Government) 
The Government of Canada’s departmental IT security has 
published a Guide for IT Security Incident Responders, 
specifically for use by federal government departments and 
agencies to develop and update their IT security incident 
response plans or procedures [16]. 
1) Motivation and Objectives 
This Guide for IT Security Incident Responders is crucial, 
especially when IT security personnel are required to hand-over 
incident investigations to law enforcement without compromising 
or damaging the digital evidence. It puts the proactive 
preparation with regard to the actual forensic investigation into 
perspective [16]. 
2) Gaps that Need Bridging 
The Guide for IT Security Incident Responders document 
assumes that the respective department is maintaining a security 
policy and an incident response plan. The department should be 
compliant with the Canadian Treasury Board Secretariat’s 
Management of Information Technology Security (MITS) 
Standard and should have a departmental security policy in place.  
In addition, it assumes that the department has established 
connection to Public Safety Canada’s Canadian Cyber-Incident 
Response Centre (CCIRC) and has an incident response plan in 
place. Both policy and plan act as a preventative measure in case 
of a digital crime [16]. 
The guide further assumes [16] that the relevant department 
acts in accordance with the Treasury Board Secretariat’s 
Government Security Policy (GSP). As a result, departments 
should be correlated with relevant law enforcement agencies. The 
agencies will be the main point of contact in the case of incident 
detection. 
D. United States 
Forensic readiness for a computer system, as defined by the 
US, is the capability of the system to efficiently collect credible 
digital evidence that can be used in legal proceedings [17]. This 
specific project focuses on the cost aspect of digital forensics, 
since cost often is a deciding factor for systems that are not yet 
forensics ready. 
1) Motivation and Objectives 
The clear specification of forensic requirements should lead 
to the development of systems that meet these requirements. 
Consequently, this will allow the development of a standardized 
procedure that enables the formalization of a digital forensic 
investigation. [17]. 
Accordingly, the US proposal for a forensic policy approach 
to define forensic capabilities for a system makes it a lot easier to 
specify what is allowed and what disallowed, pertaining to 
computer system security.  The forensic policy therefore aims to 
set rules and specifications to capture digital evidence in such a 
way that the forensic integrity of the data is preserved for legal 
purposes. Thus, a forensic policy should address both reactive 
and proactive requirements of digital evidence [17].  
The forensic policy should pertinently state which events are 
considered forensic noteworthy and what data needs to be 
preserved for which forensics reasons. As a result, a forensics 
policy partitions the space of all possible breaches or criminal 
activity into a set of events, which require forensic action, and 
those that do not [17]. 
In complementation of the forensic policy, the forensic 
readiness policy should address all aspects that need to be in 
place before the occurrence of any forensic related security 
incidents.  This should also address the system preparation for 
potential legal incidents by collecting and preserving data, and 
the eventual reduction of costs of later prosecutions.  This policy 
should further address the efficient use of resources, by 
specifying proactively what type of data should be preserved and 
what data is not necessary for preservation and data integrity.  A 
clearly stated forensics policy would greatly clarify what needs to 
be preserved and for which set of events [17].  
2) Gaps that Need Bridging 
Digital forensic readiness is often ad hoc and no consistent 
application or framework exists globally.  As a result, there is no 
standard way to specify a computer system's forensic capabilities 
or to formally compare systems.  In addition, there is no 
recognized means to implement mechanisms that enforce 
forensics capability [17]. 
E. Australia 
The commencement of the 21st century brought a global raise 
of awareness on information security issues and government-led 
research. The Australian government, as part of its information 
security strategy to promote information sharing across the public 
and private sectors, founded the E-Security National Agenda 
(ESNA). In addition, the government participated in the National 
Cyber Exercise (Cyber Storm I, II, III) [18] in an attempt to 
review incident response capabilities and raise awareness.  
1) Motivation and Objectives 
There is no doubt that exercising and reviewing the post-
incident side of a crime is vital. However, current efforts towards 
securing the control systems of the Australian critical 
infrastructure focus on preventative security measures; 
operational constraints are often in conflict with such measures. 
In such an environment the requirement for a forensic readiness 
capability is significant; conversely, there is currently an absence 
of methodologies and tools supporting forensic response to 
incidents in this environment. The development of enhanced 
forensic capabilities requires collaboration between the 
government, the private sector and academia. 
The Queensland University of Technology has initiated an 
academic project entitled: “Forensic Readiness in Control 
Systems: Tools and Methods”, which aims to minimize the 
consequences of security incidents in control systems while 
supporting real-time forensic attribution, by identifying 
techniques and methodologies which enable post-attack live 
forensic investigations with minimal impact to operations. 
This project will specifically focus on enhanced capabilities 
to permit triage, rapid situational awareness, remediation of 
incidents, and forensically sound attribution of malicious 
activities, enabling: rapid and accurate diagnosis of event cause; 
containment and isolation of compromised systems; preservation 
of forensically sound evidence; and rapid provision of accurate 
incident related information to government stakeholders. 
The outputs of this project aims to support forensic readiness 
and capabilities from the public and private sector. 
F. ISO (International Organization for Standardization) 
Although not directly applicable to digital forensic readiness, 
the international standard ISO/IEC CD 27037 – “Information 
technology – Security techniques – Guidelines for identification, 
collection, acquisition and preservation of digital evidence” 
relates directly to the field of interest.  This standard is currently 
in its third Committee Draft.  If there are no further delays in the 
process, the final standard should be published by May 2012 
[19].  
This International Standard provides guidelines for specific 
activities in the handling of digital evidence that may be of 
evidential value.  These activities include identification, 
collection, acquisition and preservation of digital data and 
provide guidance to the individuals responsible for implementing 
the activities.  
1) Motivation and Objectives 
The steps discussed in ISO/IEC 27037 are necessary to 
maintain the integrity of the digital evidence.  Although the 
proposed standard does not include forensic readiness, adequate 
forensic readiness can largely support the identification, 
collection, acquisition, and preservation process of digital 
evidence.  Accordingly, this standard can play an important role 
in initiatives that implements forensic readiness. 
The proposed standard [19] ensures that responsible 
individuals manage digital evidence in accordance with practical 
ways that are acceptable worldwide, with the objective to 
facilitate investigation involving digital devices and digital 
evidence in a systematic and impartial manner while preserving 
its integrity and authenticity. 
In addition, the proposed standard intends to inform decision-
makers that need to determine the reliability of digital evidence 
presented to them.  It is applicable to organizations needing to 
protect, analyze and present potential digital evidence, and is 
relevant to policy-making bodies that create and evaluate 
procedures relating to digital evidence, often as part of a larger 
body of evidence.  
2) Gaps that Need Bridging 
ISO/IEC 27037 complements ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO/IEC 
27002, especially with regard to the control requirements 
concerning potential digital evidence acquisition by providing 
additional implementation guidance. 
In addition to ISO/IEC 27037, there is another proposed work 
item that addresses digital evidence readiness - Incident 
management, operation and response.  This proposed standard 
will address the need for readiness in terms of the completeness 
of the process to identify, acquire and preserve digital 
evidence.  The understanding is that there must be a plan, 
resources and a means of locating sources of useful data, ideally 
before the incident occurs.  This project is currently in an 
extended study period phase.  A decision should be made in 
October 2011 regarding the future of the project. 
III. FORENSIC READINESS POLICY 
The initiatives, reviewed in the sections above, stress the need 
for the development, integration and implementation of proactive 
forensics standards, including the formulation of an 
organizational policy which will consider the preventative side of 
security.  
The need for the implementation of an FRP has been 
highlighted by a number of authors. Rowlingson [20] not only 
approaches forensic readiness from a technical viewpoint, but 
also gives specific weight to procedures and processes 
underlining the need for organizational readiness. The author 
proposes a ten-step framework in implementing forensic 
readiness; the application of the steps forms the basis of a 
forensic readiness policy and includes: risk assessment, 
identification of sources and evidence, legal capabilities, storage 
and monitoring policies, staff training and legal review 
assessment.  
Similarly, the lack of a formally developed forensic readiness 
policy in academia and industry has advocated research on what 
such a policy should contain. Taylor, Endicott-Popovsky and 
Frincke [17] indicate the absence of appropriate theory for 
devising FRP and propose an approach for devising such a policy 
based on computer security policy specification. Their approach 
is data and event-based, specifying the data and events that will 
escalate to a full formal investigation. FRP prerequisites are: risk 
assessment, digital assets and data identification, “forensic-
ready” data identification, and forensic readiness policy 
implementation.  
The contents of a proactive policy should primarily take into 
account forensic readiness’ implementation objectives. The 
objectives, established by Tan [2] and  Rowlingson [20], involve: 
Digital Forensic Investigation (DFI) cost minimization and 
digital evidence usage maximization. Hence, the formulation and 
justification of such a policy will be based on components that 
satisfy both of these objectives. Combining past 
recommendations and including numerical validation of digital 
evidence, we proceed by proposing a number of components that 
the formulation of an FRP should consider: 
• DE identification. 
• Risk Assessment by classifying DE exposure and 
correlating with threats. 
• Control to DE access and maintenance of a Digital Chain 
Of Custody (DCOC) [21]. 
• Statistical representation of the DE by establishing a 
Bayesian network; it will calculate the relationship 
between cost and benefit factors of each measure. 
• The events that will escalate an event into a full forensic 
investigation; the policy should specifically correlate 
events with the established Bayesian network. 
• Evidence Management Plan development [22]. 
• Single Point of Contact (SPOC) establishment with legal 
authorities. 
• DFI model choice - the procedure to be followed after an 
incident occurs [23]. 
• Technical infrastructure standards [24]. 
• Staff training procedures on the policy’s contents. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER DIRECTIONS 
We have, throughout this paper, expressed the need for 
forensic readiness standardization. Firstly, we have introduced 
major difficulties faced by organizations when applying digital 
forensic readiness standards. The aforementioned difficulties 
were the main motive behind the initiation of research by a 
number of governments, organizations and academic institutions. 
Thus, we have identified initiatives in the UK, US, Australia and 
Canada, and discussed their background, motivations and 
objectives. By pointing out gaps that need bridging, the need for 
the implementation of a formal policy on forensic readiness has 
arisen. Consequently, we have informally proposed devising a 
forensic readiness policy based on specific components. 
In the light of the initiatives undertaken by governments, the 
private industry sector should follow suit. Despite the emerging 
development of proactive forensics standards across the private 
sector, the only one formally in place is being implemented by 
the Payment Card Industry (PCI). Organizations complying with 
the PCI DSS standard need to have proactive measures in place. 
According to the A.1.4 requirement [25], organizations should 
"enable processes to provide for timely forensic investigation in 
the event of a compromise to any hosted merchant or service 
provider". 
As the UK initiative has shown, organizations are seeking 
third-party assistance in order to adhere to risk assessment 
regulations. Superficially there is reason to think that 
organizations are interested towards producing and maintaining 
digital evidence of forensic value.  However, their approach is 
primarily cost-biased. As a result, our future work will include 
the development of a forensic readiness system that will focus on 
cost-effectiveness. 
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